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Abstract 
This paper provides a risk-based framework for deciding on which IT services to outsource 
and which to keep in-house.  This framework considers the probabilities both of negative 
outcomes, and of failing to achieve positive outcomes.  The authors examine the major 
components of outsourcing risk and their drivers, and from this derive a series of questions 
decision-makers can ask when deciding what sourcing options to adopt for different services.  
The framework was developed on the basis of five years of qualitative and quantitative 
research into the experiences of organizations involved in outsourcing IT. 
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Introduction 
One important decision when developing an IT strategy is how to source the various IT 
services needed by an organization. While many sourcing strategies are available, the 
decision-maker is ultimately confronted with two choices. The organization may manage, 
control and coordinate the delivery of an IT service internally (whether services are 
performed by internal staff, or contract staff under the organisation’s control). Alternatively, 
it may delegate this management to an external provider who is responsible for specified 
outcomes.  The label “outsourced” is applied to situations where this management is 
devolved. 
Outsourcing of IT services is now widely promoted by both vendors and consultants, yet 
empirical research has revealed large-scale dissatisfaction and the frequent failure to achieve 
the financial and strategic goals set for it (Rouse, 2002; Gartner, 2002).  In light of this, 
choosing when and what to outsource, and subsequently, how to evaluate alternatives to 
outsourcing, have become key issues for IT decision-makers. There are several models and 
rules of thumb available.  Some are appealingly simple, such as “don’t outsource strategic 
services – outsource commodities”. We found that, in practice, these were unhelpful, because 
of the difficulty in determining what is “strategic” and what is “commodity”.  Other rules of 
thumb, such as those based on transaction cost economic (TCE) theory (Williamson, 1975) or 
agency theory (Eisenhardt, 1985), are complex, and simple decision-rules based on these 
theories often downplay important variables like complexity, uncertainty, and market depth. 
Still other decision-rules emphasize competitive positioning (Lacity, Willcocks & Feeny, 
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1995; 1996) – an important issues for commercial organizations, but less so in the not-for-
profit and public sectors.  
In this paper we approach the choice of services to outsource from a risk-based perspective, 
and present a framework and a set of questions managers in the field can ask when evaluating 
candidate IT services to outsource.  
Research method and data sources 
This framework draws on existing theory, as well as a series of qualitative and quantitative 
studies we have done over the last five years. These include a survey of 240 medium to large 
government and non-government purchasers of IT servicesi (described in Rouse, 2002); a 
longitudinal case study of the Federal Government’s IT outsourcing arrangements (Rouse & 
Corbitt, 2002); and 16 focus group interviews with vendors and managers involved in 
selecting IT services to outsource (Rouse, 2002).   
Our qualitative informants (from the case studies and focus groups) included both public and 
private sector purchasers of IT services, and ranged from those with over 7 years experience 
of outsourcing to those evaluating sourcing options for the first time. The organizations they 
represented ranged in size from relatively small (50 “seats”) to very large (2000+ “seats”).  
As part of a wide-ranging discussion with these informants on their outsourcing experiences, 
we asked them to identify problems they were experiencing with selecting IT services to 
outsource, and what their experiences were once they did outsource. It is from their responses 
that we developed our framework.  The approach we used to analyse the data was 
hermeneutic analysis (c.f. Lee, 1994). Full details of the analysis strategies are discussed in 
Rouse (2002). 
The issue of criteria 
A key issue for decision-makers when choosing the best sourcing strategy for different IT 
services is “what is the criteria to be optimised?”  Most of the existing decision frameworks 
address the services-choice in efficiency terms: i.e. “Which strategy is likely to lead to the 
lowest cost?”. This approach assumes that services are held constant; whereas our research 
revealed that different options may deliver quite different levels of services, with consequent 
impacts on organizational performance.   
Outsourcing is now carried out for many different reasons and decision-makers typically need 
to choose between competing objectives.  In particular, the need to conserve organizational 
and managerial attention (so that it can be redirected to the organization’s core competencies) 
is now well recognized, while the rapid changes in markets and technologies highlight the 
importance of scalability, flexibility and organizational agility.  In many cases, the 
maximisation of these can conflict with the need to conserve financial resources, so the 
usefulness of decision-rules based just on cost savings is limited. 
Another problem with efficiency-based decision rules is that they are essentially abstract. The 
decision-rule might predict that certain courses of action will lead to greater efficiency in the 
long run. However, the prediction may be undermined when decision makers receive bids 
from vendors and proceed to cost alternatives. In essence “tangible” financial figures crowd 
out theoretical considerations.  Yet these “tangible” figures are not risk or error free. A 
number of respondents reported that their decision-making was overly optimistic. When 
presented with a seemingly attractive service/cost ratio, decision-makers chose a sourcing 
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strategy (usually outsourcing) on the basis of a “best case scenario” without considering the 
probabilities either of attaining the expected service/cost goals, or of experiencing critical 
negative consequences.   
This perhaps explains why so few quantitative studies have been able to substantiate the 
benefits promoted for outsourcing. In our survey, only one in three (36%) outsourcing 
arrangements were reported as satisfactory by the survey respondents, and structural equation 
modelling revealed the negative outcomes were largely due to the failure to achieve cost 
savings and other strategic benefits (Rouse et al, 2001). The likelihood of not obtain expected 
cost savings expected from outsourcing IT was high, with only 42% of respondents reporting 
any savings at all, and only 7% reporting substantial savings.  In our qualitative research, both 
vendor and client informants described many situations where vendors deliberately or 
unconsciously underbid the outsourcing contract.  Kern et al (2002) label bids won in these 
circumstances the “winner’s curse” because vendor and client tend, in the long run, to suffer 
substantially. Given the apparently widespread practice of underbidding, treating financial 
projections at face value, without taking into account the risk that they won’t eventuate, or the 
risk of service degradation, is likely to lead to poor decision outcomes.  
Minimizing risk in outsourcing 
These observations led us to reframe the choice of which services to outsource in terms of 
risk minimisation, rather than efficiency.  The positive benefits of IT outsourcing – such as 
organizational flexibility and agility, cost reductions, and the capacity to redirect attention 
and resources to core competencies – are extensively promoted by vendors, and by 
consultants who often derive substantial outsourcing-related income.  Discussion of risks and 
downsides is generally left to academics and researchers. Yet the choice of which services to 
outsource and which to retain in-house depends on the interplay between benefits and risks. 
For each potential outsourcing contract the various risks must be weighed against the likely 
outsourcing benefits.  
Both potential benefits and risks are probabilistic, and herein lies a problem – if decision 
makers are misinformed about the likelihood either of benefits, or of negative consequences, 
this weighing up will be faulty. Estimating probabilities and the negative impacts of a 
decision is a core aspect of risk management, but it is less common to consider the 
probabilities of achieving benefits (or conversely, of failing to achieve these). The 
outsourcing literature is characterized by little probabilistic research into the extent of risks, 
partly because most outsourcing research has been based on statistically unrepresentative case 
studies. While many of these cases experienced poor outcomes from outsourcing, their 
singularity means they provide no data on the extent of risks in the wider community.   
For the same reason, there is limited information available on the extent to which expected 
benefits fail to materialize; although the spate of recent studies reporting widespread 
dissatisfaction with IT outsourcing (including Rouse et al, 2001 and Gartner, 2003) provides 
evidence that this failure is commonplace.  Given the intense effort required to investigate 
and adequately plan for IT outsourcing, the failure to achieve expected benefits is important, 
as the resources devoted to outsourcing have a substantial opportunity cost. Consequently, the 
extent to which expected benefits do not eventuate represents a significant risk associated 
with the endeavour.  
Practitioners and academics have articulated the risks of IT outsourcing for over a decade. 
These will vary in magnitude and impact on the organization, and may include immediate, 
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local consequences (such as the failure to roll out a planned desktop upgrade, for example) as 
well as subsequent and longer-term negative effects on organizational performance. The most 
obvious risk is that cost savings projections are not achieved.  Other IT outsourcing risks 
highlighted by case study and theoretical literature (particularly Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993, 
1995; Earl, 1996; Lacity & Willcocks, 2001; and Rouse, 2002) include: 
· Service degradation, with consequent impacts on organizational performance; 
· Being locked into higher-than-market cost structures, or obsolete technology; 
· Additional unforseen costs of ensuring compliance, negotiation, and litigation; 
· Organizational disruption and additional costs of poor transition; 
· Vendor related risks (e.g. vendor overselling its capabilities; vendor going out of business 
or walking away from that market; vendor failing to protect records; vendor 
unresponsiveness); 
· “Lock in” (where the purchaser has no option but to continue with an unsatisfactory 
arrangement); 
· Diversion of managerial attention and resources (away from core business); 
· Inflexibility (due to contractual constraints or prohibitive amendment costs); 
· Downstream organizational losses (loss of skills and tacit knowledge - and capacity to 
exploit IT for business advantage, loss of innovative capacity; loss of intellectual 
property); 
· Impacts on competitive advantage. 
While careful contracting might mitigate some of these risks, they can rarely be avoided 
completely. 
Components of risk 
Analysis of our focus group interviews indicates that three key dimensions either increased 
the likelihood of negative consequences, or decreased the likelihood of achieving the benefits 
expected from outsourcing. These are similar to dimensions identified in the Transaction Cost 
literature of the seventies and eighties (Williamson, 1975; 1985): 
1. Level of uncertainty 
2. Level of complexity 
3. Potential for opportunistic behaviours 
1. Uncertainty 
Sourcing decisions, which require managers to analyse alternative cost streams for services to 
be delivered in the future, inevitably incorporate substantial uncertainty.  The essence of the 
contractual relationship lies in attempts by both the vendor and client to project what will 
occur over the life of the contract (and beyond) in order to agree on a mutually satisfactory 
exchange. Unfortunately, our studies reveal that levels of uncertainty involved in the 
outsourcing of IT services are much higher than for other services used as exemplars of 
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satisfactory outsourcing - cleaning, catering, or refuse collection (Domberger, 1998). Yet this 
uncertainty is rarely reflected in benefit/cost analyses. 
The economic arguments for outsourcing IT assume that the purchaser and provider can 
largely foresee, codify, and cost the services that will be required by the purchaser, during the 
life of the contract.  “Best practice” advice (e.g. Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993; 1995; Lacity 
and Willcocks, 2001) demands a detailed contract that describes the services, fees, and 
penalties that will occur during a foreseeable future, and assumes that these projections are 
relatively accurate. To the extent that this idealized situation can be approximated, decision-
making becomes a matter of comparing cash flows over time for alternative service-delivery 
strategies. Our research indicates, however, that even in a situation of relative predictability 
such comparisons are not easy, as they involve high levels of uncertainty when issues of 
projected volumes, timing, and even taxation treatment, are considered. Our study of the 
Federal Government’s outsourcing experiences confirmed that even when detailed financial 
analysis is carried out, business case estimates of the savings produced by outsourcing IT can 
be overstated by a factor of 100%. Issues of legal and taxation interpretations can further 
compromise benefit/cost projects (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002).  
Our case studies (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002) also reveal that in situations of only moderate 
uncertainty a complex, detailed contract decreased organizational flexibility and dramatically 
increased the level of managerial attention needed to govern the outsourcing relationship. 
Many line managers in the Federal Government agencies found that, rather than letting them 
concentrate on their core business, outsourcing was a major distraction that forced them to 
pay attention to issues that were previously handled smoothly because of common 
understandings with their internal delivery function. They are not alone, less than 40% of the 
240 Australian organizations we surveyed reported that they could concentrate more on their 
core business as a result of outsourcing – yet this benefit is promoted as the most attractive 
for outsourcing.  
Like earlier researchers (Lacity & Hirschheim 1993; 1995; Willcocks & Fitzgerald, 1994) we 
concluded that outsourcing services will succeed to the extent that decision-makers can 
reduce the uncertainty involved in predicting and articulating the required services, volumes, 
and likely delivery costs. However, our informants revealed that in many cases their capacity 
to accurately forecast these aspects was poor. Some reasons for this are discussed below.  
2. Complexity 
The sheer number of elements involved in complex undertakings means that they are difficult 
to comprehend, and this is a source of error if systems for managing complexity fail. 
Processes for improving systems development success through project management and 
control of details are grounded in this observation, as are strategies such as breaking down 
outsourcing arrangements into small, manageable subprojects that can be more easily 
evaluated and managed. But we observed errors and problems even with detailed, highly 
structured outsourcing projects. In situations of complexity the combinatorial explosion of 
these potential interactions can quickly magnify small individual risks into large, compound 
risks.  Risk is magnified, rather than just accumulated.   
3. Potential for opportunistic behaviour 
Opportunistic behaviour has been described (Williamson, 1985) as self-seeking with 
deception (or guile). It occurs in outsourcing when one party exploits, to its own ends, 
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information not held by the other party, or the other party’s inflexibility or vulnerability. The 
extent to which such behaviour is likely is a critical component of outsourcing risk, and has 
received considerable attention in earlier research (eg Lacity & Hirschheim, 1993; 1995).   
Drivers of opportunism, uncertainty and complexity 
We identified a number of drivers that increase the three key dimensions of risk: 
opportunism, uncertainty, and complexity.  By considering these drivers, decision makers can 
more accurately choose which IT services to keep in-house, and which to outsource.  These 
drivers, and the relationships between them, are summarised in Figure 1. 
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Drivers of opportunism 
Market depth 
In outsourcing, opportunism on the part of the vendor is likely to occur when the client 
becomes dependent, either because of switching costs; a substantial mismatch in knowledge 
and information (information asymmetry); or because there are too few vendors in the 
marketplace to ensure competition (lack of market depth).  In the Australian IT marketplace, 
such circumstances occur frequently, and lack of market depth exacerbates other sources of 
dependency. 
Our informants revealed many instances where they were continuing with unsatisfactory 
arrangements because the organization could not face the financial or organizational costs of 
changing vendors. In one Government agency this had forced the purchaser to extend the 
original contract three times, not because management were satisfied, but because they could 
not afford the organizational disruption involved in switching vendors. Since there was no 
competitive pressure on the vendor, the contract prices paid by this purchaser on renewal 
were substantially higher than market prices.  
Not all our respondents reported this level of “lock in” but many were involved in 
unsatisfactory arrangements that were difficult to get out of. Several (purchaser) informants 
reported that at contract end they could not attract bids from alternative vendors. Some also 
reported their incumbent vendors were claiming that as a result of initial underbidding, they 
expected to raise prices 30 to 40% when the contract came up for renegotiation, even though 
historically technological changes have led to cost reductions. Having disbanded their internal 
delivery capability, these purchasers reported that they felt held to ransom by their vendor, as 
the time and investment associated with re-establishing the capability were prohibitive. It is 
noteworthy that a number of the existing large government IT outsourcing contracts 
(including the South Australian Government and many Federal agencies) are now moving 
away from single-vendor outsourcing to a multiple-vendor, multiple-contract strategy. While 
such a strategy will almost certainly involve substantial increases in transaction and 
coordination costs, it has become necessary because of lack of competition in the Tier 1 
vendor marketplace. 
Level of standardization 
Transaction Cost Theory (Williamson, 1975; 1985) argues that because of the likelihood of 
opportunism, outsourcing is economically unattractive for tailored services, and our research 
supported this. Informants involved in outsourcing standard service components (like 
network wiring, hardware support, and the support of simple desktop environments) generally 
reported greater levels of satisfaction and higher levels of perceived control. There is a 
relatively robust and reliable vendor market in Australia for these services, with a pool of 
skilled staff in the employment marketplace. On the other hand, purchasers of complex 
infrastructure arrangements that were tailored to the purchaser’s needs ¾ particularly those 
that involved multi-tier architectures, integration of legacy systems with desktop 
environments, or where security was important ¾ often reported that services provided by 
vendors were inadequate and costly.  
For standardized, mature services there was also a robust body of expert consultants from 
whom purchasers could seek advice and information. This helped purchasers avoid the 
problems of information asymmetry, a situation that also leads to opportunism. In 
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circumstances where technologies were rapidly evolving vendors had substantially more 
technical and pricing knowledge than most purchasers. Many purchasers felt their vendors 
exploited this information asymmetry. Other purchasers in these circumstances hired external 
consultants to advise them, but this added substantial costs that destroyed their original 
benefit/cost business case. Despite the risks of opportunism associated with information 
asymmetry, most of our informants (and the large majority - 72% - of those in the survey) 
were outsourcing to obtain skills and expertise they did not have available in house – a 
situation almost certain to lead to asymmetry. 
A common strategy used by informants to mitigate information asymmetry was 
benchmarking. Our research revealed that those who spent money on benchmarking had 
statistically discernable improvements in vendor service, and strategic and technical benefits, 
as well as lower costs (Rouse, 2002). Our qualitative research, though, revealed that while 
benchmarking was necessary, the costs and limitations were significant. High-level industry-
benchmarks were too general to reveal true comparisons, and in many cases unless they 
actually market tested, purchasers found it difficult to establish with any accuracy what 
“market prices” were for the services they required. Yet a detailed market testing exercise 
consumes substantial levels of organizational resources (including managerial attention), and 
benchmarking is really only possible for services already widespread, and standardized, in the 
community.  The inability to accurately determine how efficient the internal delivery group 
actually was meant that decision rules, like those of Lacity et al (1995; 1996) that relied on 
relative efficiency (lagging vs. leading practices) were less helpful than expected.  
Drivers of uncertainty 
Technical maturity 
In a classic paper, McFarlan (1981) identified two key source of uncertainty in IT projects 
that have implications for IT outsourcing.  The first, technological uncertainty, is associated 
with the technological maturity of the client organization.  In relation to outsourcing, 
technologies might be “immature” because: 
· the technology is rapidly evolving, 
· the marketplace has not yet stabilized, or  
· the technologies are new to the organization.   
Our research leads us to conclude that lack of technological maturity was a critical reason for 
the widespread dissatisfaction reported for outsourcing. Many informants reported particular 
problems with complex inter-networked desktop platforms and n-tier e-business technologies. 
Specifying and evaluating such technologies (in a situation of rapid technological evolution) 
was difficult for most, leading to substantial problems and cost escalations.  
In contrast, where the services outsourced were well understood and technically mature, such 
as 1970’s and 1980’s mainframe services, or relatively simple standardized desktop platforms 
and networks, outsourcing was more successful.  In these circumstances, purchasers were 
able to clearly articulate their requirements and standards, knew how to evaluate service 
quality, and could diagnose common service failures.  
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Clarity of requirements 
A second source of uncertainty reported by McFarlan was related to requirements. Our 
informants identified several reasons why a high level of requirements uncertainty exists in 
outsourcing arrangements.  Sometimes their organizations had no practical experience of the 
features a new IT system or service was to provide, particularly if these involved novel 
technologies. Consequently those specifying requirements were largely relying on 
imagination.  In such cases the client’s initial experiences of the system or service inevitably 
changed their understanding of what was required, leading to expensive variations in the 
contract. Other organizations knew at an abstract level what was needed, but could not 
articulate the detailed requirements and performance levels expected because they no longer 
had staff experienced at an operational level with the technologies. This resulted in 
specifications that were ambiguous, and as a result to disputes requiring a high level of 
managerial attention. 
Uncertainty also arose when there were widely divergent views in the organization about 
future requirements, and the priorities to be assigned to them.  Several informants reported 
situations where individual organizational units were clear about their own requirements, but 
there was no agreed corporate priority.  In these cases, the requirements changed depending 
on the political power and influence of different organizational units.   
These problems were exacerbated when business requirements were evolving rapidly. In the 
public sector agencies we studied, frequent changes in policy requirements, and the 
machinery of government, often dictated radical changes in service requirements.  In private 
sector organizations, mergers/acquisitions and new business strategies had the same effect. In 
such circumstances the use of legal contracts and control processes became inflexible and 
expensive.  Our case studies and survey data suggest that organizations significantly under-
estimated the level of organizational change they would encounter. This had major 
implications for their optimistic financial projections. 
Uncertainty was compounded when services were provided on a time and materials, or full-
time-equivalent (FTE) staffing basis. While outsourcing is promoted as an outcome-based 
delivery model, many of our informants could only forecast some services (such as analysis 
and design, or specialist technical services) by the hour or manday.  In these circumstances, 
predicting final costs was difficult, and there were opportunities for vendors to exploit the 
situation.  
Drivers of complexity 
Scope 
The scope of an outsourcing arrangement affects its complexity. Several of our case studies 
involved large-scale outsourcing arrangements, and without exception, these were complex, 
difficult to manage, and major drains on the management attention in the organization, even 
though they were not necessarily financial failures (Rouse & Corbitt, 2002). Despite their 
scope, these arrangements involved what has been described as “selective” outsourcing 
(Lacity & Willcocks, 1996), as purchasers outsourced only about half the IT budget. 
Conversely, we found examples of smaller organizations successfully outsourcing almost all 
their IT services (based on standardized environments) to a single vendor (that is, “total” 
outsourcing). These arrangements were relatively low in complexity, even though they met 
Lacity et al’s definition of “total” outsourcing. Our research suggests that the failures of the 
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“total outsourcing” cases studied by Lacity and Hirschheim (1995) ¾ the source of Lacity 
and Willcocks’ 1998, data ¾ was related to their complexity, not to the extent of IT budget 
outsourced.  
Interdependence 
Because of the pervasive nature of IT services, most of our informants reported that their 
operational activities were highly dependent on their outsourced services. Consequently “best 
practice” advice to outsource only services that are relatively quarantined from other business 
processes (Lacity et al, 1995; 1996) was not feasible.  Many reported that managing business 
processes dependent on outsourced services was more difficult than managing those 
dependent on services delivered in-house, because the formality of control processes for 
outsourcing reduced responsiveness. Situations that would have been handled in-house with a 
brief internal discussion often escalated into major administrative headaches. The problems 
of interdependence are magnified when an outsourced arrangement in place. 
Points of responsibility 
Our informants also reported that complexity increased substantially when the number of 
“points of responsibility” increased.  Many, after experiencing vendor problems with a prime-
contractor or single-vendor model, had adopted, or were contemplating moving to, a 
multiple-contractor strategy. Such a strategy was strongly encouraged by the consultants and 
experts they relied upon.  However, those who had adopted this strategy reported that having 
multiple vendors increased contractual and managerial complexity considerably. Multiple-
vendor arrangements also substantially increased contractual and coordination costs 
(transaction costs), particularly for small purchaser organizations, and tended to decrease the 
influence purchasers had with individual vendors.  Another source of “points of 
responsibility” complexity was the process of clustering, or grouping relatively disparate 
organizational units to gain economies of scale.  In the Federal IT outsourcing case (reported 
in Rouse & Corbitt, 2002) clustering was economically successful, but was abandoned 
because of the operational trade offs required, and the increased demands on managerial time.   
Technological Complexity 
Many of our informants’ organizations had complex technical environments, which proved 
problematic when outsourced.  A typical purchaser might have several networked desktop 
operating environments, multiple servers running different operating systems and different 
applications tailored to the organization’s needs, some multi-tier e-business and Internet-
based systems, and sometimes legacy systems based on outdated software environments. 
Diagnosis of problems in these circumstances is difficult, and our informants often reported 
that a single vendor could not adequately support their environment. This led to difficulties 
and disputes when multiple vendors were involved. There was a marked contrast between the 
technical environments in our informants’ organizations and those of the highly publicized 
early IT outsourcing success stories. While large in scope, those involved relatively low 
levels of technical complexity ¾ a single-vendor and homogeneous mainframe environment 
that preceded the Internet, n-tier client-server, and desktop environments of the mid to late 
90s. 
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A consolidated framework of selection risk 
We found that many of these drivers were interrelated. For example, outsourcing of 
technically immature services affected both uncertainty (through inability to specify and 
measure outcomes) and opportunism (through lack of standardization). Conversely, when the 
service outsourced was highly standardized, many risks could be overcome because the 
standardized requirements meant there was generally a large body of purchasers with 
common needs, and as a consequence a deeper and more vigorous vendor marketplace. 
Informants with largely standard requirements believed that they could easily move to an 
alternative supplier, and so were willing to outsource services that were integral to their 
business. They also had the option, if necessary, of re-insourcing the service, as the pool of 
skilled staff in the employment market was high.  
This interrelation is reflected in the framework shown in Figure 1 where technological 
maturity tends to lead to standardization, which creates a greater pool of customers, and 
hence deeper marketplace of vendors.  At the same time, technological maturity also leads to 
less uncertainty as requirements are easier to specify and performance is more easily 
measured. Figure 1 also incorporates the impact of failure, as this will have an important 
moderating effect on the level of risk.  
Evaluating the Risks for Candidate Services 
The discussion above highlights a range of factors that decision-makers can consider when 
choosing alternative sourcing strategies for individual services. Where the likelihood of 
opportunism, uncertainty, or complexity is high, purchasers need to be convinced that the 
benefits of an outsourcing strategy (whether outsourcing as part of a traditional arrangement 
or a “best sourcing” arrangement) justify the high levels of risk.  In such cases alternatives 
such as retaining the services in-house, or hiring in contractors are likely to reduce risks, even 
though these options may on the surface appear to be more expensive.  Conversely, where 
services are likely to involve only moderate levels of these three aspects of risk, decision-
makers can feel more confident that the cost/benefit projections they make when bids are 
received are likely to be achieved. 
In Table 1 below, the elements of the framework shown in Figure 1 are applied. The table 
provides a series of questions purchasers can ask when evaluating the likely risks of particular 
outsourcing ventures, or when choosing whether or not a particular IT service is a good 




Risk Factor Key questions for purchaser 
Low level of 
standardization 
 
For this IT service, how willing is your organization to trade off unique requirements for the 
benefits of standardization? 
How well-codified is the service delivery process, and how widely is process-knowledge 
distributed in the community?  
Shallow market 
depth 
How many viable players are in the marketplace now; how many likely at contract end? 
What are the switching costs (financial, organizational) associated with moving to an 
alternative supplier? What are the lead times? 
What is your capacity to re-insource the services if necessary? 
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Technical 
immaturity 
Do market standards exist; how stable are they? 
What is your organization’s technical maturity in delivering these services previously - so 
how well can you specify requirements and service levels? 
How familiar is your organization with this IT service - hence your capacity to evaluate 
performance quality? 
What is your vendor’s track record for delivering this particular service? 
What is your own organization’s experience at managing outsourced IT services? 
Requirements 
uncertainty 
What is your organization’s capacity to clearly articulate the requirements and the service 
levels to be provided? 
How much agreement is there within your organization about service levels and measures? 
About priorities? 
Are you demanding competing requirements (eg flexibility or industry development vs. 
reduced costs)? 
Interdependence How many other technologies in your organization interface with the technologies involved 
in delivering this IT service? 
How many business processes depend on this IT service? 
How tightly are your business processes coupled with this IT service? 
Potential for 
opportunism 
To what extent are the services you require standardized (asset non specific) and common to 
many purchasers in the marketplace? 
To what extent does your access to information and advice about these IT services match 
those of the vendor? 
To what extent does your access to information and advice about how to manage an 
outsourced arrangement match those of the vendor? 
Uncertainty How likely are substantial changes to service requirements over the life of the contract? To 
volume changes? 
Complexity How many different processors, operating systems, and operating system versions are 
involved? 
How many different applications and software environments? 
How many independent organizational units are involved in the purchase? 
How many “points of responsibility” for delivery are there? 
How many telecommunications environments?  
How many applications that do not use a common user interface? 
Impact of 
failure 
How many critical business processes would be affected if there was a service delivery 
failure? 
How serious would the consequences of failure be on business operations, customers, 
privacy, or other legislative obligations? 
How long could your organisation go without delivery of this IT service? With substantially 
degraded service? 
What are the (short term) cost implications of service degradation, or of major changes to 
your cost/benefit projections? 
What would be the longer-term impacts on your competitiveness of continual poor service? 
Table 1: Risk factors to consider when evaluating IT services to outsource 
 
Conclusion 
The risk-based analytical framework we have developed, and the questions provided in Table 
1 expand and clarify existing decision frameworks, and act as a focus for the thinking that 
purchasers need to do before deciding on the best sourcing option. This risk framework also 
helped us make sense of the sometimes-confusing messages we received from our focus 
group and case study participants.  Those services where focus group informants reported 
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substantial cost savings and satisfaction (equipment support, installation and maintenance of 
networks, mainframe hosting, and basic support of generic software products) are generally 
low in the risk characteristics highlighted in Figure 1. They are well understood and involve 
highly standardized processes, with the consequence that purchasers are able to readily 
specify the outcomes required, and the standards expected.  Such services are also technically 
mature and stable – often involving technologies or processes developed 20+ years earlier.  In 
some areas where the technologies are quite recent (eg web hosting) – the growing 
convergence of Internet based standards has resulted in a range of newly standardized 
products and knowledge-promulgation.  As a consequence of these characteristics, there are 
robust vendor marketplaces, providing a check against opportunism and vendor lock-in. 
However, few IT services are such clear candidates for outsourcing.  Most involve one or 
more risks highlighted in Figure 1, signalling the need for critical evaluation on the part of 
decision makers.  The evidence from our converging studies is that in most cases, outsourcing 
will involve trade offs amongst the various success criteria discussed earlier in the paper, as 
well as trade offs between different sources of risk. Table 1 can assist decision makers to 
recognize and choose among these tradeoffs, and thus to increase their chances of a 
satisfactory IT outsourcing arrangement.  The framework also provides guidelines for 
purchasers who have no choice but to outsource, because they do not have the internal 
capacity to deliver an IT service, and do not have the time or resources to build it.  By 
minimizing the various risk factors shown in Table 1(by, for example, adopting highly 
standardized requirements), and by recognizing the cost implications of these risks in their 
business cases, such purchasers are less likely to be unpleasantly surprised.   
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